How does the development of formal standards for information and communication technologies shape the behavior of firms that may need the technologies to develop new products and services? We argue that standardization lowers the search costs of identifying important intellectual property rights (IPR) for standards users and reduces uncertainty related to licensing terms. These changes can clarify the risks of IPR infringement for standards-related technologies and thus decrease strategic patenting by standards users. Using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to study the behavior of firms who use but do not contribute to standards, we find that an increase in the number of IETF standards in a technological area is associated with a decline in strategic patenting in the area. The effects become larger in environments where patent rights have been strengthened or when standards-contributing firms hold a larger proportion of related patents.
Introduction
As interoperability among products in the information and communication technology (ICT) industries becomes strategically important, the development of formal standards within standards-setting organizations (SSOs) 1 has gained attention (Greenstein and Stango 2007) . In particular, standardization plays an important role in reducing the (Coasian) transaction costs of technological coordination, facilitating the development of new products and services for a broad community of ICT producers (e.g., Besen and Farrell 1991; Besen and Johnson 1988; Rysman and Simcoe 2008) . 2 Although standardization plays an important role in reducing uncertainty and the costs of technological compatibility, it can also influence the risks of intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement for ICT producers. Standardization can help to reduce the uncertainty created by patent thicketsoverlapping patent rights that are distributed across many patent holders-by identifying important IPR holdings related to standardized technologies. It can also help to reduce the uncertainty surrounding licensing terms for IPR that are essential for implementing standardized technologies. However, recent literature has also highlighted the limitations of standardization in reducing IPR uncertainty. For example, the standards-setting process may not identify all important IPR needed for implementing the standards for ICT products. Further, IPR holders often do not define precise licensing terms for their standards-essential patents, a practice that can lead to additional litigation (e.g., Lemley 2002; Lerner and Tirole 2013) . In short, it is unclear ex ante whether standardization will increase or decrease the costs and uncertainty of potential IPR infringement.
In this paper, we provide some of the first empirical evidence about the implications of standardization for IPR infringement risks. Recent research has emphasized that in environments where the existence of patent thickets and risks of potential hold-up by patentees has created uncertainty on IPR infringement, firms respond by patenting defensively to strengthen their ex post bargaining position (e.g., Ziedonis 2004 ). This type of patenting behavior is referred to as strategic patenting 3 and is commonly considered one of the main drivers of even denser patent thickets (Hall et al. 2012) . Our primary research question is: "Does the development of formal ICT standards lead to less strategic patenting?" This focus 1 Throughout this paper, we refer to the development of formal standards by firms within SSOs simply as "standardization" for the sake of brevity. Similarly, we refer to formal standards as "standards." That is, we do not specifically examine the development of standards through other means, such as "standards wars." Given our focus on technical standards, we consider the terms "standards" and "standardized technologies" interchangeable. 2 An increasing body of theoretical and empirical work has investigated issues, such as the implications of policy choices of SSOs and strategic behavior by standards-contributing firms to influence standards-setting processes. See, e.g., Baron, Meniere, and Pohlmann (2014) , Berger, Blind, and Thumm (2012) , Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) , Delcamp and Leiponen (2013) , Farrell and Simcoe (2012) , Leiponen (2008) , and Lerner and Tirole (2006, 2013) . While the issues studied by these papers are not the focus of our study, they do inform our analysis. 3 In this paper, we consider the terms "strategic patenting" and "defensive patenting" interchangeable. That is, we do not consider the patenting strategy by patent assertion entities that do not patent defensively.
on the implications of standardization for strategic patenting will enable us to draw inferences about whether standardization increases or decreases potential IPR infringement risks-that is, changes in strategic patenting will be used as a proxy for changes in IPR risks. If the creation of formal standards changes IPR risks, this would have important implications for members of SSOs, ICT producers, and policy makers. In particular, prior authors have argued that IPR risks created by patent thickets and the risks of hold-up can influence innovation (Bessen and Meurer 2008; Galasso and Schankerman 2015) and new product entry (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011; Hall, Helmers, and von Graevenitz 2015) . Thus, our findings will contribute indirectly to this widening debate.
Our empirical framework focuses on how increases in standardization (proxied by the number of standards) in a technological area over time is associated with the patenting activity of firms that are likely to use the standards to produce new ICT products but do not contribute to standards themselves. We label these firms noncontributing firms. Our focus on noncontributing firms reflects our desire to understand the impact of standardization on strategic patenting among a broad group of potential standards users as well as to avoid issues related to simultaneity between standardization and patenting among standardscontributing firms. One identification challenge we face is that a firm's patenting activity captures both its strategic patenting decision and changes in its inventive output. To help disentangle the effects of standardization on strategic patenting from invention, we compare the effects of standards contributed by firms with the effects of standards solely contributed by noncommercial entities, for which we expect the effects on IPR uncertainty will be more muted. As an additional robustness test to understand whether our results on patenting behavior reflect implications for invention rather than strategic patenting, we investigate the effects of standardization on a separate margin of activity that directly reflects inventive activity, namely, new product entry.
We study the effects of standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), one of the largest SSOs and one that is fundamental to the development of standards related to the Internet and networking technologies. The IETF has explicit rules to promote broad participation: Any interested participant has free access to the standardized technologies; participants can also vote and participate in discussions on any standards. To define our sample of noncontributing firms, we identify firms that attended the tri-annual IETF meetings but did not contribute to the writing of any documents 4 published by the IETF between 1994 and 2004, an important period in which the development and use of IETF standards accelerated rapidly (Simcoe 2012 (Simcoe , 2015 . We measure a noncontributing firm's patenting activity using the number of successful patent applications. To examine the relationship between IETF standards and 4 We acknowledge that, even if a firm does not write any IETF document, it could still make a contribution, say, by making comments in email discussions. However, because writing and publishing a document require much more effort than commenting, in this study we use authorship to identify whether a firm contributes. Relatedly, standardscontributing firms are identified based on the author affiliations of IETF standards. patenting in a technological area, we use the expertise and patenting behavior of prior standards' authors to develop a concordance between patent classes and the six technological areas defined by the IETF.
We first estimate a baseline relationship between the number of IETF standards and patenting activity among noncontributing firms. We demonstrate that an increase of 10 standards in a technological area is associated with a 1.3% decline in patenting in that area. We then examine the effects of standards contributed by firms (which we label commercial standards) and standards contributed solely by noncommercial entities (labeled noncommercial standards). We find that an increase of 10 commercial standards is associated with a 1.7% decline in patenting activity. In contrast, an increase of 10 noncommercial standards is associated with a 10% increase in patenting. The comparison between the effects of commercial and noncommercial standards is a useful way to interpret our results; for example, if we assume that standards contributed by firms and noncommercial entities have similar effects on invention, these results imply that an increase of 10 commercial standards will be associated with a 6% decline in strategic patenting activity.
To further explore our key argument that standardization can reduce strategic patenting by reducing the risks of IPR infringement, we next examine how the effects of standardization vary with differences in the ex ante risks of IPR infringement. We study whether the effects of standardization are greater in environments where IPR is stronger. In such environments, standardization could be more important in reducing IPR risks, so its effect on reducing strategic patenting should be stronger. We specifically explore the effects of changes in the legal regime covering software patents in 1996 and 1998 (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011; Hall and MacGarvie 2010; Lerner 2002) . We identify technological areas whose patents were affected by the regime changes and find that the effects of commercial standards on reducing patenting in those areas are stronger after the regime changes. Interestingly, we do not find statistically significant changes in the effects of noncommercial standards on patenting after the regime changes.
We next examine the possibility that standardization will be more effective in reducing IPR uncertainty when standards-contributing firms hold most of the IPR in a technological area. Under these circumstances, we argue that standardization will aid in identifying patents that are related to a standard but not necessarily declared as essential during the standard-setting process. We find that the number of commercial standards in an area is associated with a greater decrease in patenting when IPR in the area are increasingly held by these contributing firms. That is, standardization is more effective in reducing strategic patenting when most patents in a technological area are held by contributing firms.
We perform additional analyses to identify whether our baseline results capture the effects of standardization on strategic patenting or invention. First, we study the effects of standardization on new product entry decisions. In contrast to our results on patenting, we do not find that increases in the number of commercial standards are associated with a decline in product entry. Second, we examine how the effects of standardization vary with a firm's patent propensity. Our results are consistent with the view that the effects of standardization on strategic patenting will be strongest among firms that have been active in IPR markets in the past. Namely, although no statistically significant relationship exists between the number of commercial standards and patenting for firms with a historically low patent propensity (measured by the number of patents per product), an increase of 10 commercial standards in an area is associated with a 3.6% decline in patenting for firms with a high patent propensity. Together, these findings support the view that our earlier results demonstrate a relationship between standardization and strategic patenting.
Theoretical Motivation
In this section, we document the potential mechanisms through which standardization can influence patenting behavior. For tractability, we limit the scope of our analysis in two ways. First, as noted above, we limit our scope to the implications of standardization on the behavior of firms that do not contribute directly to the standards. This is because standards-contributing firms may patent strategically for reasons outside the scope of our study-namely, they often patent before and after the creation of a standard to appropriate returns from inventions related to the standard (e.g., Bekkers and West 2009; Bekkers, Verspagen, and Smits 2002) . Second, we study the effects only of formal standardization-that is, we do not compare outcomes under formal standardization to outcomes under situations in which technical compatibility may be obtained by other means, such as decentralized adoption (a "standards war"), following a large dominant player, multihoming, or the use of converters. 
Strategic patenting behavior and its causes
As is well known, a primary goal of the patent system is to grant inventors temporary monopoly power to profit from their invention (e.g., Scotchmer 1991). However, in environments characterized by complex and cumulative innovation, such as ICT industries, because the associated costs of IPR infringement are high, patents have also been increasingly used for strategic (or defensive) purposes. In such environments, patents can facilitate negotiations and bargaining between patentees and potential licensees when patent licensing is necessary and to discourage infringement lawsuits by increasing the potential threat of retaliation when negotiations fail (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000; Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Noel and Schankerman 2013) . We refer to this type of behavior collectively as strategic patenting.
Two factors in particular have been highlighted as causes of strategic patenting. One important factor is the existence of patent thickets, particularly in ICT industries (Noel and Schankerman 2013; Shapiro 2001; Ziedonis 2004) . When IPR is fragmented in this way, search and transaction costs are high 5 For further details on how standardization can be obtained through means other than the establishment of formal standards, see Farrell and Simcoe (2011). because there is uncertainty as to the identity of the relevant rights holders with whom one must negotiate.
Further, negotiations are normally bilateral, however, maximization of value requires a coordinated resolution across multiple claimants, leading to bargaining failures and the "complements problem" (Noel and Schankerman 2013; Shapiro 2001) . In such an environment, ex ante contracting is very difficult, leading firms to engage in strategic patenting to improve their ex post bargaining position with patentees (Ziedonis 2004) .
A second factor that may encourage strategic patenting is hold-up. 6 Firms that are developing new products must frequently make investments that are specific to patented technologies; because the outside options of technological alternatives are lower after these specific investments are made, some authors have argued this exposes the developing firm to potential hold-up by patent holders (e.g., Williamson 1985) . The risks of hold-up are not independent from the other risks created by patent thickets. IPR grant patentees an exclusionary right, not an affirmative one (Ziedonis 2004) -that is, when a firm licenses with one patentee, it does not guarantee that there are no other patent holders on which the firm might be infringing. A potential risk is that an unknown patent holder could assert its IPR after significant investments have already been made in a related technology, demanding higher royalties than could have been obtained before the potential licensee made these investments. Given such risks, firms may accumulate patents as bargaining chips in patent disputes (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004 ).
The impact of standardization on the causes of strategic patenting
In this paper, we study the development of formal standards in which a diverse group of firms cooperate to define a set of technical specifications that provide a common design for a product (Lemley 2002) . In addition to defining technical specifications, standardization frequently follows rules for disclosing patents essential 7 to the standards, as well as for negotiating licenses to these patents (e.g., Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro, and Sullivan 2007) . Here we first introduce general principles for IPR disclosure and licensing rules at SSOs. We then discuss how standardization can alleviate the risks and potential costs of IPR infringement for standards users, thus reducing strategic patenting.
Most SSOs require or request participants to disclose standards-essential patents during the standard-setting process. The scope of these rules can vary widely across SSOs in aspects such as the internal process that SSO members must follow to identify relevant IPR (in other words, whether the rules require an explicit search of the contributor's patent portfolio), what types of patents must be disclosed, the timing of required disclosure, and how disclosure rules are enforced. SSOs may also proscribe licensing 6 Our discussion here is brief. For further details on how hold-up can influence behavior in ICT-producing industries, see Shapiro (2001) and Ziedonis (2004). 7 According to Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind (2013) , a patent is considered essential if it is not possible to produce products that comply with a standard without infringing on the patent. rules, though these rules are rarely precise. In practice, many SSOs require or request that their members license their patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) or on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.
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Before a standard is established, firms that seek to develop new products may evaluate and choose from different technological alternatives. Standardization identifies particular technologies among alternatives for use by the firms. Depending on the disclosure rules, SSOs may also require members to reveal information on patents that are essential to implementing the technology. 9 Thus, after standardization, standards users may face lower costs of searching for patents that need to be deployed as part of an implementation. In some cases, disclosures do not cover all necessary patents (Bekkers and Catalini 2011; Simcoe and Catalini 2011) ; contributors may decide not to declare some patents related to the standard (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind 2013) . However, the development of formal standards will reveal the identities of contributors, and standards users can use that information to identify other patents that may be important to implementing the standard. As a result, standardization can reduce the costs of identifying patents related to technologies and protocols incorporated into the standard.
If SSOs require RAND licensing terms and bind members to a RAND policy, standardization can also reduce uncertainty around licensing rates and hold-up risks (Lemley 2007 ).
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One way of viewing RAND rules is that they should be interpreted as a mechanism to reduce the likelihood of hold-up and make negotiation between patentees and potential licensees more efficient when it is not feasible to set royalty rates prior to the formation of the standard (Farrell et al. 2007 ).
In short, prior literature on the causes of strategic patenting suggests that the risks and costs of potential IPR infringement are greater in environments in which IPR are fragmented or when hold-up risks are high. In these environments, firms that have aggressively acquired patents will be better positioned to engage in ex post bargaining with patent holders and may avoid lawsuits if their patent portfolios raise the possibility of defensive litigation against patent holders seeking to assert their IPR. We argue that standardization can reduce some of the costs arising from fragmented IPR and hold-up risks for standards users and therefore reduce the need for strategic patenting. This view is consistent with Delcamp (2015) , who suggests that the introduction of patent pools related to standards can reduce IPR uncertainty and therefore facilitate dispute resolution by settlement. 8 Lemley (2002) studied 36 SSOs and found that, of these, 29 required members to license patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, and an additional three requested that they do so. 9 However, disclosure does not provide standards users with perfect information on all IPR related to the standard. We discuss this in further detail below.
A variety of other licensing terms have also been proposed for SSOs, including royalty-free licensing, and various proposals for ex ante licensing agreements (e.g., Farrell et al. 2007; Lemley 2007) . However, these alternatives are not widely in use at the moment.
The following example provides some context to understand our argument. In 1998 several Japanese companies that were part of the WIDE (Widely Integrated Distributed Environment) Project launched the KAME Project, which combined different efforts at implementing Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) into a single software stack that would be implemented in the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) operating system (DeNardis 2009).
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The goal was to develop free software for BSD. KAME's software required implementing a number of protocols, and initially (April 1998 -March 2004 it did not implement protocols that either required licenses for implementers or users or were not free of charge for use.
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After the project had been going on for some time, KAME discovered that several of the protocols that had been implemented had IPR restrictions. Although initially they tried to remove these protocols, it was determined that such a policy would be wasteful in view of previous efforts. As a result, the project subsequently One protocol that KAME wished to use was NEMO (Network Mobility Basic Support Protocol), which allowed mobile networks to attach to different points on the Internet (Devarapalli et al. 2005) . The shows both how the standards-setting process can help to clarify and bring to light IPR related to a standard (and thereby reduce search costs for standard users) and also help to clarify licensing obligations (and thereby reduce the risks of hold-up).
11
IPv6 is a protocol that is meant to replace the version of the Internet protocol now most commonly used on the Internet, IPv4. Among other things, IPv6 relaxes the restrictions on the number of available addresses for IP-enabled devices. 12 For further details, see DeNardis (2009) (Lemley 2002) . Further, standardscontributing firms may have incentives to claim that some related IPR is not essential to the standard and thus is not subject to disclosure requirements (Bekkers et al. 2013 ). More broadly, enforcing disclosure requirements may be difficult, even for SSO members (Farrell et al. 2007 (Farrell et al. 2007 ). SSOs may similarly not clarify nondiscriminatory licensing policies. Defining discriminatory practices is difficult, and even identifying differential licensing practices is difficult when cross-licensing practices are common (Farrell et al. 2007) . A recent body of literature has raised questions about the overall effects of RAND terms on mitigating the hold-up problem, particularly in environments where IPR is fragmented and bilateral negotiations in the face of the complements problem are particularly costly. This has led to concerns of "royalty stacking" among patentees within standardssetting efforts (Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee 2007; Lemley 2007) . Meanwhile, some patented technologies would become essential and valuable only because of standardization (Lerner and Tirole 2013) , encouraging their patent holders to litigate more aggressively (Galasso and Schankerman 2010) .
In closing, a common theme throughout this section is that standardization can reduce the search costs of identifying IPR related to standard implementation and reduce hold-up risks through RAND licensing terms; as a result, standardization could affect standard users' strategic patenting behavior.
However, the impact of standardization may vary significantly, depending upon the rules of the SSO. In the next section, we describe in additional detail the standard-setting process and rules of our setting, the IETF.
Research Setting
We examine the implications of the development of formal standards by one SSO, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), for several reasons. First, since it was established in 1986, the IETF has emerged as the de facto forum to define standards related to the Internet and computer networking, in particular the Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) (Simcoe 2012) . Therefore, our study is less subject to the issue that firms engage in forum shopping for SSOs (Lerner and Tirole 2006). 15 Second, because the IETF has no membership restriction and strongly encourages open participation (Krechmer 2006) , it provides us with a setting to study the implications of standardization for a broader community of ICT producers. Third, the rules for SSOs vary widely (Lemley 2002) , as do the technological areas that they standardize, implying that incentives to engage in strategic patenting are likely to vary widely across SSOs. We focus on one SSO to mitigate the extent to which heterogeneity across SSOs might influence our estimates.
As described on its website, 16 the IETF divides its standardization work into the following major technological areas: "Application," which focuses on application protocols such as email and HTTP; "Transport," which develops protocols such as TCP to support Internet-based applications to exchange data; "Internet," which covers topics such as IP and the implications of IPv4 and IPv6; "Routing," which is responsible for developing routing-related protocols and ensuring continuous operation of the Internet routing system; "Operations and Management," which discusses issues such as network management and DNS operations; and "Security," which designs security-related protocols for the Internet.
In each of these technological areas, working groups are created to address specific technical problems that are clearly relevant to the missions of the IETF. 
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Because of the growth and commercialization of the Internet, the number of firms (as opposed to noncommercial entities) that have participated in the IETF increased from only 55% in 1993 to more than 80% in 2001 (Simcoe 2012). 19 Participation in the IETF is open to anyone and can take various forms.
Besides contributing directly to the IETF by publishing RFCs, firms can attend tri-annual IETF meetings 15 One concern is that a few other SSOs, such as W3C and OASIS, cover a similar technological area as the Application area of the IETF. To address this issue, we test the robustness of our results by dropping all observations in the Application area. The results are largely qualitatively similar and available upon request.
16
See www.ietf.org/iesg/area.html for a detailed description of these different technological areas and related working groups.
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See RFC 2418, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2418/, for more detailed information on how working groups are created and operated. 18 Further discussion of these institutional details can be found in Simcoe (2012) and Waguespack and Fleming (2009). 19 These numbers are compiled by Simcoe (2012) : They are computed as the share of participants in email discussions whose email top-level domains are dot-com or dot-net.
as well as get involved in the standards-setting process by participating in email discussions hosted by working groups.
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As it has become increasingly common for technical specifications proposed at the IETF to be read by IPR such as patents, the IPR policy at the IETF has also gradually changed over time. Prior to 1996, under the governance of the IPR policy specified by RFC 1602, the standards-setting process rejected technical proposals that were read by IPR (including copyrights, patents, or patent applications), unless the IPR holders provided prior written assurance that "any party will be able to obtain the right to implement and use the technology or works under specified, reasonable, non-discriminatory terms" (Huitema and Gross 1994) . Although RFC 1602 does not clearly delineate disclosure rules, it states that "it is the responsibility of all contributors to standards work to inform the IETF Secretariat of any proprietary claims in any contributions" (Huitema and Gross 1994) . Beginning in 1996, the standards-setting process at the IETF was governed by the IPR policy specified by RFC 2026 and later clarified by RFC 3979.
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The new rules changed how technologies in standards could be encumbered by IPR. As implied in section 10.3.2 of RFC 2026 and clarified in section 8 of RFC 3979, while technologies without IPR or royalty-free licensing are strongly preferred, IETF working groups have the discretion to adopt certain technology with fair and nondiscriminatory terms or even with no licensing commitment if the technology is significantly superior to alternatives (Bradner 2005) . Regarding the IPR disclosure rule, RFC 2026 suggests that "the contributor represent that he has disclosed the existence of any proprietary or intellectual property rights in the contribution that are reasonably and personally known to the contributor" (Bradner 1996, p. 29) . RFC 3979 further specifically explains the IPR disclosure rule in section 6, stating that the contributor who reasonably and personally is aware of IPR covering his or her contribution must make a disclosure (Bradner 2005) .
Although not required, contributors are strongly encouraged to include licensing information in IPR disclosures, as well as making the disclosures as soon as possible after the contribution is published as an Internet Draft (Bradner 2005) .
Empirical Framework

The patent production function
To investigate the effects of standardization on strategic patenting, we follow existing literature on strategic patenting (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004 ) and focus on the implications for the number of successful patent applications by a firm. Because a patent reflects both an inventive output and a control right over an invention, one challenge of this approach is disentangling the effect of 20 For further details on the benefits firms may achieve by participating in SSOs, see Delcamp and Leiponen (2013) , Leiponen (2008) , and Waguespack and Fleming (2009). 21 RFC 3979 was published in 2005 and was intended to clarify the IPR issues addressed by RFC 2026 instead of modifying or altering the existing rules (Bradner 2005, p. 5) . standardization on strategic patenting from its effect on invention. Motivated by the patent production function approach originally introduced by Pakes and Griliches (1984) , we incorporate the effects of standardization into a firm's knowledge production function and its patent production function and employ structural assumptions to generate bounds for the effects of standardization on strategic patenting.
We assume the knowledge production function for firm i in technological area k in year t (denoted K ikt ) follows the Cobb-Douglas form, which can be written as follows:
R ikt is the research expenditures related to area k by firm i in year t. includes factors that can affect the productivity of a firm's R&D, and we assume it takes the following form:
= exp (γ 1 *ComStandards kt + γ 2 *NonComStandards kt + η*U ikt + a ik + b t ).
We expect standards contributed by either firms (ComStandards) or noncommercial entities 22 (NonComStandards) could influence a firm's R&D productivity. U ikt represents other time-varying factors that can affect a firm's R&D productivity. a ik is a time-constant variable that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity across firms and area. b t indicates a vector of time dummies.
Substituting (2) into (1) and taking the log of equation (1), we have log K ikt = γ 1 *ComStandards kt + γ 2 *NonComStandards kt + η*U ikt + a ik + b t + θ*log R ikt .
Given that a firm's patenting activity is measured by the number of patents, we assume a firm's patent production (Y ikt ) follows a Poisson process with parameter λ ikt taking the following form λ ikt = exp(P ikt 'κ). So E (Y ikt | P ikt ) =λ ikt = exp(P ikt 'κ), where:
In equation (4), ω represents the elasticity of patent production with respect to knowledge increments. d t again includes a set of time dummies to capture the general time trend in patenting. v ikt represents factors that influence the patent propensity that cannot be accounted for by firm's newly created knowledge-that is, the propensity to engage in strategic patenting. In light of our prior discussion on the role of ComStandards in section 2, v ikt can be decomposed into the following variables: ComStandards kt ; a set of time-varying observables, X ikt ; and unobserved heterogeneity across firm and area, c ik . Therefore, P ikt 'κ can be rewritten as follows:
Substituting (3) into (5), we then have the following form of P ikt 'κ:
P ikt 'κ = β 1 *ComStandards kt + β 2 *NonComStandards kt + δ *U ikt + ρ*X ikt + ω θ*log R ikt + α ik + χ t, where β 1 = ω γ 1 + τ, β 2 = ω γ 2 , δ = ω η, α ik =ω a ik + c ik , χ t = ω b t + d t .
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These noncommercial entities include universities or other nonprofit organizations, such as the IEEE and the ITU.
Estimating equation (6) will provide estimates of β 1 and β 2 . Bounds of the effects of ComStandards on strategic patenting (τ) can be derived depending upon different assumptions. First, if we assume that γ 1 = γ 2 > 0, that is, standardization by firms and by noncommercial entities has the same positive effect on firm invention, then τ would equal β 1 -β 2 .
We next loosen this assumption, to allow for heterogeneity in the effects of ComStandards and NonComStandards on invention. We do this because firms contributing to standards may behave strategically to create or maintain market power (Simcoe, Graham, and Feldman 2009) . For example, they may influence standards to incorporate technologies that give them a time-to-market lead (Eisenman and Barley 2006; Farrell and Simcoe 2012) or IPR licensing revenue (e.g., Bekkers, Duysters, and Verspagen 2002) . Such strategic behavior might increase the uncertainty of making R&D investments in standardized technologies and therefore dampen the productivity-enhancing effects of standards developed by commercial firms, relative to those developed solely by noncommercial entities. Thus, we would expect γ 1 < γ 2 . In particular, if we assume that γ 1 = 0, then β 1 will be an upper bound of τ.
We acknowledge that γ 1 could be greater than γ 2 . Further, γ 1 could be less than zero if strategic behavior by standards-contributing firms depresses incentives for other standards users to innovate. To address this concern and shed additional light on the effects of standardization on invention, as a robustness test we also examine the relationship between standardization and the new product entry decisions of standards users.
Implementation and identification of the baseline model
We employ firm-technological area fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across technological areas that may be correlated with both a firm's patenting behavior and standardization. As mentioned above, because Y ikt in equation (4) is measured by the number of successful patent applications,
we employ a Poisson model with conditional fixed effects. Thus, the baseline specification can be written as E (Y ikt | P ikt , α kt ) =λ ikt = α kt *exp(P ikt 'κ), where P ikt 'κ = β 1 *ComStandards kt + β 2 *NonComStandards kt + δ *U ikt + ρ*X ikt + χ t, .
We use the cumulative number of standards that include any contributions by firms in technological area k by year t to measure ComStandards kt . Similarly, we use the cumulative number of standards developed solely by noncommercial entities in technological area k by year t to measure
NonComStandards kt . The vector U ikt includes three variables that can affect firm's R&D productivity: firm i's inventive capability in area k in year t, which is measured by the quality of its existing patents (PatentQuality ikt ); the overall technological capability of firms in area k in year t, measured by the average patent quality related to the area (AreaPatentQuality kt ); firm i's sales growth in year t (SalesGrowth it ).
The vector X ikt includes the following variables that can influence a firm's patenting output. First, as highlighted in section 2, the existence of patent thickets in an area can incentivize firms to develop a defensive patenting strategy. Therefore, following Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) , we include in X ikt the total patent stock in an area (AreaPatentStock kt ) as a proxy for the level of patent thickets. Second, larger firms may enjoy economies of scale in innovation production (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Henderson and Cockburn 1996) , so we include the number of employees (Employees it ) in X ikt to control for these effects.
χ t includes a full set of yearly dummies.
We were unable to obtain data related to the R&D expenditures by a firm related to a specific technological area, and so we are unable to directly estimate the coefficient of R ikt specified in equation (6).
Thus, the effects of R&D expenditures-or the portion of R&D expenditures that are not controlled for by employment-are included in the error term of our baseline regression. However, as discussed in additional detail below, we obtain data on R&D expenditures by firm-year (R&D spending it ) for the set of public firms in our sample and include this variable in robustness tests. All regressions use robust standard errors clustered by firm, as a firm's patenting decision across different technological areas may be correlated. As described below, we also test the robustness of the results using two-way clustering of standard errors by firm and technological area, and the results are qualitatively similar.
Our focus is on the coefficients β 1 and β 2 . As discussed earlier, if we assume that 0 ≤ γ 1 < γ 2 , then β 1 would be considered the upper bound of τ and β 1 -β 2 would be a lower bound of τ. For simplicity, our discussions below focus on β 1 , the upper bound of τ. Estimates in this model must be interpreted carefully, as the number of both commercial standards and a firm's successful patent applications in a technological area can be influenced by unobserved time-varying factors, potentially biasing the estimate of β 1 in a positive direction. For example, unobserved market activity or rapid technological change could affect the number of commercial standards and a firm's patenting activity. This particular bias works against our finding of a negative association between commercial standards and patenting. In the next section, we describe how we use a source of exogenous variation in our data to better draw a causal connection in the relationship between standardization and patenting behavior.
Commercial standards and the strength of software patents
In an ideal world, we would have access to an experiment that exogenously changes the number of standards in one technological area but not another. We do not have such an experiment available. To provide more confidence that the relationships we identify are the result of a causal story, we exploit exogenous regime changes during our sample to the strength of patents in some technological areas. This change will increase the propensity to engage in strategic patenting in the affected technological areas, but not others. However, if commercial standards mitigate the risks of patent thickets and hold-up, then the effects of this regime change will be weaker in an environment with a larger number of commercial standards. Although this analysis will not enable us to recover the effects of commercial standards on patenting behavior, a finding that commercial standards mitigate the effects of stronger IPR is consistent with the discussion in section 2.
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Another way to view this exercise is that if commercial standards could reduce IPR infringement risks, this role will be more important in environments where the ex ante IPR infringement risks are high, namely, the areas affected by the regime changes. That is, we would expect the negative effect of commercial standards on patenting to be stronger following the regime changes.
We use changes in the strength of software patents during our sample period. A detailed description of these changes can be found in Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) and Hall and MacGarvie (2010) . In short, prior to 1996, software was patentable only when tied to physical or mechanical processes. However, a series of court decisions in 1994 and 1995 affected the scope of software patents and finally resulted in new U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) guidelines published in 1996 that loosen some of these restrictions and essentially allowed inventors to patent any software embedded in physical media. The State
Street decision in 1998 then led to the second important expansion of software patentability: softwarerelated business methods and disembodied algorithms. These two regime changes not only resulted in an increase in applications for those types of software patents but also strengthened the validity and enforceability of the software patents that were granted before the regime changes. Prior work has shown that these changes had a significant impact on firm strategy, such as the decision to enter into a new market or to join a platform (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011; Huang, Ceccagnoli, Forman, and Wu 2013) .
As is discussed in additional detail in Appendix A.1, these two regime changes influence different technological areas in our sample at different times. In our baseline specification, we pool the effects of the two regime changes but in robustness explore their effects separately. In this model, the specification of P ikt 'κ can be rewritten as follows.
P ikt 'κ = β 1 *ComStandards kt + β 2 *NonComStandards kt + β 3 *ComStandards kt * D(regime
D(regime change) kt is a dummy that turns on in areas that were affected by the regime changes (for details on how this variable is constructed, see Appendix A.1). As discussed earlier, we expect ρ 2 to reflect the effects of increases in IPR strength on strategic patenting in the absence of commercial standards and to be positive. In contrast, we expect β 3 to reflect how commercial standards mitigate the effects of stronger IPR and to be negative.
Commercial standards and IPR holdings by standards-contributing firms
23
Our primary identification assumption for this analysis is that the change in the strength of patents did not arise as a result of changes in patenting behavior.
Next, we examine differences in our results depending upon the patent holdings in a technological area among standards-contributing firms. As is well known, in environments with dispersed and overlapping IPR, a large set of patents have the potential to read on the focal firm's technologies. Further, while standards-essential patents may be disclosed during standardization, some IPR may still exist that is not disclosed as being standards essential but may still be important for implementation (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind 2013) .
When standards in a technological area are developed by a group of firms that hold a large proportion of patents in the area, standardization is more effective in revealing the holders of both standardsessential and related patents. In this environment, the focal firm faces lower costs in identifying those IPR by just searching the patent portfolios of contributing firms. Such a reduction in search costs can decrease the incentives of standards users to engage in strategic patenting. We employ the following specification of P ikt 'κ to investigate how the effect of standardization varies with the extent to which contributing firms hold IPR in an area (IPR_Contributors kt ).
24
In keeping with the discussion above, we expect β 3 to be negative. P ikt 'κ = β 1 *ComStandards kt + β 2 *NonComStandards kt + β 3 *ComStandards kt * IPR_Contributors kt + δ *U ikt + ρ*X ikt + ρ 2 * IPR_Contributors kt + χ t + ε ikt, (9) 5. Data
Sample
Because the standards published by the IETF are available for use by anyone and firms are not required to use standards, it is very difficult to identify the universe of noncontributing firms that need to use IETF standards for their products. We define firms that might use standards as ones that have sent employees to attend one of the tri-annual IETF meetings. We use the following steps to define our sample firms. First, we retrieve all attendees' affiliation information from IETF meeting proceedings from 1994 to 2004, either through the attendee's email address or through the reported affiliation name. Second, in order to obtain data on the size-related variables for the sample firms, we match the firms collected from the first step with the 1994 to 2004 editions of the CorpTech directory of technology companies (CorpTech). CorpTech covers over 35,000 firms in high-tech industries and reports detailed annual information, such as sales, employment, websites, email addresses, and product portfolios; this data set has been used by studies of inventive activity and strategic behavior 24 Note that the extent to which contributing firms hold IPR in an area (IPR_Contributors) is different from the level of IPR concentration in an area, which is defined as the extent to which IPR is distributed across different patent holders (Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011; Wen, Ceccagnoli, and Forman 2015) . 25 We acknowledge that, by defining the sample in this way, our research may provide limited insights on the behavior of very small firms that never participated in the IETF meetings. among firms in ICT industries (e.g., MacGarvie 2009, 2011; Huang et al. 2013; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo 2006) . We match based on email address and organization name. The coverage of the CorpTech database is much more comprehensive for firms that are owned by U.S. entities than for those owned by non-U.S. entities. As a result, to maintain a consistent sample, we exclude firms owned by non-U.S. entities, yielding a sample of 834 firms. Third, as noted above, we exclude standards-contributing firms from the sample to address the potential issue that contributing firms may patent strategically for reasons that we do not study. Therefore, we exclude firms that have contributed any IETF documents (including both standards-track and nonstandards-track RFCs) during our sample, 26 resulting in 566 noncontributing firms. Each of the 566 firms enters our sample starting from the first year that we observed its employee(s) attending the IETF meetings and remains in our sample unless it exited either through acquisition or bankruptcy. 
Defining technological areas and the matched patent classes
We use the technological areas established by the IETF to define the technological areas used in our empirical analysis. As mentioned above, these areas include application, transport, Internet, routing, operations and management, and security. One important part of our data construction is identifying the most important patent classes related to each of our focal technological areas so that we can measure the implications of standardization for patenting behavior. Creating this concordance is challenging, and little prior work exists that we could use to guide our efforts. That is, if a noncontributing firm is excluded from contributing to standards simply because of its size or technological capability, it should be able to contribute to nonstandards-track documents, as the requirement on publishing this type of documents is typically low. We examined the characteristics of firms that contributed to standards and found that small and large contributing firms contributed a comparable number of IEFT standards across different areas during our sample period. 27 We identify whether a firm was acquired based on whether there is any change in its status from an independent company to a subsidiary or division of another company, the data for which are directly obtained from CorpTech. If we do not observe any information about a firm for three consecutive years in CorpTech, we assume it has exited the market.
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For two earlier examples that have tried to map patents to technological markets, see MacGarvie (2011) and Wen, Ceccagnoli, and Forman (2015) .
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In all empirical analyses of this study, we focus on RFCs published during our sample, i.e., from 1994 to 2004.
provided by the Harvard Dataverse Network (Lai et al. 2013 ).
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These two steps are completed through a combination of automatic and manual search. Third, because the U.S. Patent Inventor Database includes the mapping between patent inventors and patents, we are then able to identify for each RFC, the set of patents held by the RFC authors as well as these patents' main three-digit USPTO classes. Last, we aggregate all these RFCs' patent classes to the technological-area level, and, for each area, we use the top 10% most frequent patent classes as the representative patent classes for that area.
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For an illustration of the data construction process, see Appendix A.2.
To validate our concordance, we study the citation patterns of patents in each technology area. Simcoe (2015) examines the information flows among standards published by the IETF and finds, based on citation patterns, a stronger interdependency among standards within an area than across areas. If we have successfully identified the patents most closely related to a technological area, we should similarly observe that patents related to a technological area are more likely to cite one another relative to patents in a different area or some other patent that is not matched to a technological area in our sample. As reported in more detail in Appendix A.2, this is what we find, lending credibility to our procedure.
Key variables and measures
Using the concordance described in section 5.2, we identify the number of successful patent applications from firm i in area k and year t to measure our dependent variable. Because of the applicationgrant delay, we appended data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent data project (which ends with patents granted in 2006) with our own data that we downloaded from the USPTO and ends in 2010. Thus, our data captures all patents that were applied for by 2004 and granted by the end of 2010.
We use the cumulative number of standards-track RFCs (in hundreds) published in area k from 1994 to year t to capture standardization in area k in year t. Following Simcoe (2012) If an author is matched to only one inventor based on his/her full name, we consider it is a correct match. If an author is matched to multiple inventors, we choose the inventor who also matches on either location or affiliation.
31
Note that our method creates a many-to-many mapping, where a patent class could be matched to multiple technological areas and a technological area could be matched with multiple patent classes. 32 We are grateful to Tim Simcoe for allowing us to use their data set to measure this variable. These data are available for download at http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/code/SSOCommittees-DataFiles.zip.
NonComStandards might be subject to the issue that authors with commercial email accounts (e.g., hotmail.com) would be classified into ComStandards, even if they were individual contributors or from noncommercial entities. To mitigate this concern, we employ an alternative measure of ComStandards 33 ComStandards is therefore computed based on the cumulative number of standardstrack RFCs (in hundreds) that are contributed by CorpTech firms.
As mentioned earlier, the vector U ikt in specification (7) The other main variable in our analyses is the extent to which contributing firms hold patents in an area (i.e., IPR_Contributors kt ). We measure it using the fraction of patents in area k and by year t that are held by firms that have contributed in area k by year t. As noted earlier, by matching RFC authors' affiliations with CorpTech, we are able to identify the set of contributing firms as well as their detailed information such as full company names. To measure IPR_Contributors kt , we first match the contributing firms' names with the assignee names in the assignee database provided by the NBER Patent Data Project.
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More specifically, we first conduct automatic matching using email addresses and then use manual verification based on reported institution names. Among 2,350 combinations of standards-track RFCs and author email addresses, 75% are either matched to CorpTech or belong to university/nonprofit organization email addresses; for the remaining 25%, we manually checked their email domains and found that most of them are foreign firms. 34 We lag all right-hand-side patent-based variables by one year.
Because the NBER Patent Data Project provides detailed mapping between assignees and patents granted from 1976 to 2006, we obtain the contributing firms' patents granted in this period and these patents' main three-digit USPTO classes. Second, based on the concordance between technological areas and patent classes, we identify the set of patents that are matched to area k and granted by year t to firms that contribute to area k by year t. Then, IPR_Contributors kt is measured by the claims-weighted count of patents by contributing firms identified from the previous step, divided by the claims-weighted count of all patents granted by year t and matched to area k. We employ claims-weighted count as our baseline measure, as claims capture the legal scope of an invention, that is, the extent to which a patent is resistant to invalidation challenges (Cohen and Lemley 2001) . However, we also measure this variable using the raw count as a robustness check. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables used in our regression analyses. On average, 57 standards were developed by firms whereas 11 standards were developed from noncommercial entities in an area by a year. The sample firms vary considerably in patent quality, employment size, and sales growth rate. Therefore, we take the log transformation of these variables in regression analyses.
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On average, the sample firms only applied two to three patents in a year in one of the six technological areas focused by the IETF. Although the median value of this variable is zero based on the full sample, its median value is one in the regression sample, which, due to the employment of a conditional fixed-effects Poisson model, drops the panels without any patent for the entire sample period or with only one observation.
To develop a better understanding on the heterogeneity among these six technological areas, we present the means of the key variables by technological area in Table 2 . The Internet area and the Operations and Management area have higher numbers of standards contributed by commercial entities than other areas; noncommercial participants seem to focus on developing standards in the Application area and the Internet area, with very few standards developed in Routing and Operations and Management. Regarding the patent landscape across these areas, the Internet, Transport, and Application areas have more patents than other areas, whereas the Operations and Management area and the Transport area have a higher proportion of patents held by contributing firms. The patent quality is largely similar across all these areas.
Empirical Results
The effect of standardization on a firm's patenting activity
In this section, we seek to establish the relationship between standardization in a technological area and a firm's patenting activity in that area. We first examine how the total number of standards in an area is associated with patenting by pooling the number of standards contributed by firms and noncommercial 35 When sales growth rate is negative, we first take the log of the number without the minus sign and then multiply the logged value by negative one. entities together (Standards). Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimation results. The coefficient of Standards is significantly negative and indicates that an increase of 10 standards in a technological area is associated with a 1.3% decline in patenting activity in the area. Column (2) shows that a similar pattern is found if we only focus on commercial standards (ComStandards).
We next estimate the coefficients in specification (7) to understand how patenting is influenced by standardization by firms and by noncommercial entities. As noted earlier, we can use this to make inferences about the effect of standardization by firms on strategic patenting (τ in specification (5)). As presented in column (3) in Table 3 , an increase of 10 noncommercial standards in an area is associated with a 10% increase in patenting from noncontributing firms; an increase of 10 commercial standards is associated with a 1.7% decline in patenting. Based on the patent production framework introduced in section 4.1, the positive and significant coefficient of NonComStandards suggests that standardization by noncommercial entities can encourage firm invention. At the same time, the estimated coefficient of ComStandards in column (3) captures two different effects of firms' standardization efforts: their effects on a noncontributing firm's invention and their effects on the need for strategic patenting. If we assume that standardization by firms has the same effect on invention as standardization by noncommercial entities, the estimates indicate that as firms contribute 10 more standards in a technological area, a noncontributing firm would reduce its strategic patenting activity by 6%. But, under the assumption that standardization by firms has no effect on invention, an increase of 10 commercial standards would be associated with a 1.7% decrease in strategic patenting.
As noted earlier, for our baseline measure of ComStandards we used the top-level domain of an author's email address to determine whether a standard was contributed by firms. One concern is that standards developed by authors with a commercial email domain such as hotmail.com would be classified as associated with a firm. Therefore, as a robustness check, we measure ComStandards using the number of standards that are contributed by CorpTech firms. The results based on this alternative measure are reported in column (4), and are consistent with those in column (3). We next add to the baseline specification a linear time trend that interacts with area-fixed effects to control for unobserved time-varying area-specific trends. The estimates, shown in column (5), are qualitatively similar to our baseline results in column (3). However, we note that the magnitudes of most of the coefficients differ from the comparable estimates in column (3). This may be due to the multicollinearity among some of those variables, so caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these results.
Exploring heterogeneity in the effects of standardization on patenting
In this section, we report results exploring how the effect of standardization varies with (1) the ex ante IPR litigation risk in a technology area and (2) the proportion of IPR in an area that is held by standardscontributing firms.
Commercial standards and the strength of software patents
As discussed in section 4.3, we expect that standardization by firms will have a stronger effect on reducing strategic patenting in environments where patent rights have been strengthened. Column (1) of Table 4 presents the results based on specification (8). Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on the interaction term ComStandards x D(regime change) in column (1) is significant and negative. The estimated marginal effects suggest that there is no significant relationship between the number of standards and patenting before the regime change. However, after patent rights are strengthened, an increase in 10 standards in a technological area is associated with a 2% decline in patenting activity. Further, the strong and positive coefficient of D(regime change) seems to suggest that firms did respond to the regime change by increasing patenting afterward. The point estimate suggests that, after the regime changes, firms' patenting in the affected areas increased by 7% on average when compared with the unaffected areas. More importantly, we observe firms increased patenting only in areas with few commercial standards but not in areas with many commercial standards: In areas where the number of commercial standards is low (ComStandards is evaluated at the 10th percentile), firms' patenting increased by 16% following the regime changes; but, in areas where the number of commercial standards is high (ComStandards is evaluated at the 90th percentile), the marginal effect of regime changes on patenting is insignificantly negative.
In column (2) of Table 4 , we estimate the separate effects of each of the two regime changes. We employ two dummies-D(regime change 1) turns on for the Operations and Management area and the Routing area after 1996 and remains zero for all other areas and times; D(regime change 2) turns on for the Application and Internet areas after 1998 and remains zero for all other areas and times. As shown by the coefficient of ComStandards x D(regime change 1), we again see the effect of the first regime change differs significantly between areas with few commercial standards and areas with many commercial standards. The interaction of the second regime change and commercial standards is weaker both statistically and in terms of its economic importance. This is unsurprising because, as noted in Appendix A.1, business method patents related to the 1998 regime change likely had a limited effect on technologies developed in the Application and Internet areas.
We next use the standards contributed by noncommercial entities to conduct a falsification test. As implied by our patent production framework in section 4, we should expect no differential effect of standards by noncommercial entities before and after patent rights were strengthened. Therefore, we add the interaction of NonComStandards and D(regime change) to specification (8). The result is reported in column (3) in Table 4 . The results are, as expected, statistically insignificant; however, this is due in part to the large standard error on the coefficient estimate of NonComStandards x D(regime change). Moreover, even when we include the interaction term NonComStandards x D(regime change) in our regression, we continue to observe that the negative effect of standardization by firms is stronger after the regime changes, as indicated by ComStandards x D(regime change).
Commercial standards and IPR holdings by standards-contributing firms
We next investigate how the effect of standardization on strategic patenting varies with the proportion of IPR in a technological area that is held by contributing firms. Column (4) of Table 4 presents the baseline results based on specification (9). As shown by the sign of the interaction term (i.e., ComStandards x IPR_Contributors), in areas where the contributing firms hold a large proportion of IPR, standardization has a significantly more negative effect on strategic patenting than in areas where contributing firms hold a small proportion of IPR. Column (5) reports the results from measuring ComStandards using the set of standards developed by CorpTech firms, which are very similar to those in column (4). As in column (3) of Table 4 , we also utilize the set of standards contributed by noncommercial entities to conduct another falsification exercise. Namely, we add the interactions of NonComStandards with IPR_Contributors to specification (9) and present the results in column (6) of Table 4 . As expected, we do not observe a statistically significant differential effect of standards by noncommercial entities between areas where contributing firms hold a large versus a small proportion of IPR.
Exploring the effect of standardization on strategic patenting vs. invention
In this section, we conduct two additional analyses to probe whether our results thus far reflect changes in strategic patenting behavior or in inventive output. First, we employ product entry as an alternative proxy for changes in a firm's inventive output. If we do not find that increases in standardization lead to less product entry, we will have additional confidence that our main results reflect strategic patenting behavior. Second, we examine whether our results are different for firms that have displayed a presample propensity to patent intensively.
We first investigate the relationship between standardization and invention by studying the product entry behavior of firms in our sample. Although we do not have data on the list of products introduced by firms in our sample, CorpTech provides detailed information on the product markets in which each firm is active. our unit of analysis is at the firm-technological area-year level, the first step is to match product markets with the six technological areas used in this study (i.e., Application, Transport, Internet, Routing, Operations and Management, and Security).
We provide a detailed discussion of our matching procedure in Appendix A.3. Here we provide a brief description. We first match a sample of single product firms (i.e., firms that are active in only one product market) to the six technological areas based on their conference attendance and participation in email discussion forums. Second, according to the product markets of these single-product firms, we are able to identify all possible downstream product markets that could be matched to each of the six areas.
Then, we choose the most relevant product markets for each area (i.e., markets for which the standards in an area are most likely to be used). At the same time, we ensure that, for each product market, the matched area is the most important area. That is, for each technological area, we identify the most relevant downstream product markets and, for each downstream product market, identify the most relevant technological area. During this data construction process, we are forced to drop the Internet area and the Operations and Management area, as standards developed in these two areas are frequently used in multiple downstream product markets. Meanwhile, given that the Routing and Transport areas tend to be matched to common downstream markets, we combine these two areas into one.
The final concordance used in the analyses consists of three technological areas matched to six downstream product markets. We acknowledge that, based on this matching procedure, we are not able to match all relevant product markets to a technological area, nor can we match all relevant technological areas to a product market. Our strategy has been to focus on the set of product markets and technological areas for which we have the highest confidence in identifying a clean match. However, given the limited number of product markets and technological areas included in this concordance, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting these results.
The dependent variable used in this set of analyses is a dummy variable (ProductEntry ikt ) that equals one if firm i enters into any market related to area k in year t, and zero otherwise. After a firm enters a market, it is no longer at risk of entry, and so no additional observations for that firm-technological area are included in the sample. Similarly, we drop all firm-technology-year observations for firms who have already entered prior to the beginning of the sample. 37 We assume all firms that have not entered into markets related to the focal areas are potential entrants. The final sample consists of 286 firms with a total 5,205 observations. We include all explanatory variables in specification (7) in this set of analyses and 37 We acknowledge that we may potentially drop some large firms, which will make the results from this restricted sample not comparable with the results based on the full sample. However, we compare firm size (founding year, sales, and number of employees) between firms kept in this restricted sample and those being dropped. There is no significant difference between the two groups.
employ a linear probability model, which eases our ability to interpret interaction terms in the model (Ai and Norton 2003). 38 Column (1) of Table 5 reports our main results. The estimated coefficients for both ComStandards and NonComStandards are positive, though not significant, providing little evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis that commercial standards lead to a decline in inventive activity. To provide further evidence on the effect of standardization on product market entry, we investigate how our results vary with the industry in which a firm is located. Among the three technological areas we study in this analysis (Application, Security, Transport and Routing), we expect firms producing telecommunications hardware to be particularly sensitive to the changes in standardization in the Transport and Routing area; similarly, standardization in the Application area may have a greater influence on software firms. Therefore, we construct a new variable, RelatedIndustry, which equals one for software (hardware) firms in the Application (Transport and Routing) area, 39 and add its interaction with ComStandards to the specification.
As can be seen in column (2) of Table 5 , the interaction term is significantly positive, indicating that standardization in an area may particularly encourage product entry for firms that are closely related to that area.
Overall, the estimates in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 support our argument that the negative and significant coefficient of ComStandards discovered in our baseline specification (e.g., Table 3 ) reflects a negative effect of standardization on strategic patenting instead of invention. However, one challenge in interpreting these results is that the sample firms as well as the technological areas in these analyses are different from those in the baseline sample. Therefore, we re-estimate our baseline specification (7) using this restricted sample (i.e., 286 firms, three technological areas, and a total 5,205 observations).
We also investigate how the effect of standardization on patenting varies with firm industry, for both the restricted sample and full sample. The results are reported in column (3), (4), and (5) of Table 5 respectively. In contrast to the product entry regression results, overall we find a negative effect of commercial standardization on patenting, although results differ across specifications. In column (3) we find that commercial standards are negatively associated with patenting, however, the estimates are roughly half the size of those in Table 3 and are now statistically insignificant. In column (4) we add the interaction term for related markets. These regressions show that the effects of commercial standards on patenting activity depend upon whether the firm is in a related industry, at least in the restricted sample used in columns (1) and (2). More interestingly, the negative interaction term (i.e., ComStandards x RelatedIndustry) suggests that firms in closely related industries reduce strategic patenting to a greater 38 As an additional robustness check, we employ a Cox proportional hazard model, and the results are qualitatively similar.
39
More specifically, we define software firms in our sample as the ones with NAICS code 511210; similarly, firms producing telecommunication-related hardware are the ones with NAICS starting with 334. extent. The positive effect of commercial standards on strategic patenting in this sample is surprising and inconsistent with results elsewhere in this paper. One can think of this as the effects of commercial standards in telecommunications technologies on the behavior of software firms and the effects of standardization in the Application area on telecommunications hardware firms. Perhaps in this narrow set of industries and technological areas, the effects of commercial standards on invention are stronger than those on strategic patenting. In column (5) we re-estimate the model in column (4) using the full sample. In the full sample, commercial standards are associated with a decline in strategic patenting in both related and unrelated industries.
We next investigate how the effects of standardization vary with a noncontributing firm's patent propensity. If the results identified in the previous sections reflect the effects of standardization on strategic patenting behavior, we should observe a stronger (more negative) effect for noncontributing firms with greater patent propensity, as these firms may be more sensitive to the benefits of standardization in reducing IPR-related uncertainty. We acknowledge two limitations to this analysis. First, since our dependent variable is patenting, the effects of commercial and noncommercial standards on patenting may be lower for firms with a lower patent propensity for mechanical reasons-it may be difficult to identify the effects on patenting behavior for firms that do not patent frequently. Further, patent propensity is itself an endogenous choice and so may reflect other unobserved firm characteristics. Nonetheless, the analysis does provide additional information about how the effects of commercial and noncommercial standards differ across an important part of our sample.
To investigate how our results differ for firms with a higher patent propensity, we compute the presample ratio of patent stock to number of different products (PatToProductRatio). A higher PatToProductRatio means a firm tends to hold a larger number of patents for each of its products. This approach is roughly similar to the way in which economists have measured patent propensity, for example, the proportion of invention for which a firm seeks patent protection (Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen 2008) .
The patent stock data were directly obtained from the NBER Patent Data Project. We use the total number of different product markets to proxy for the number of different products for each of our sample firms.
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the results. The coefficient of the interaction of ComStandards with PatToProductRatio is significantly negative. The implied marginal effect suggests that while there is no significant relationship between the number of commercial standards and patenting for noncontributing firms with a low patent propensity (i.e., when PatToProductRatio is evaluated at the 10th percentile), an increase of 10 commercial standards is associated with a 3.6% decline of patenting for noncontributing firms with a high patent propensity (i.e., when PatToProductRatio is at the 90th percentile).
We further add the interaction of NonComStandards and PatToProductRatio. We expect that since they do not influence strategic patenting behavior, standardization efforts from noncommercial entities should have little differential effect on firms with high versus low patent propensity. Column (2) of Table   6 shows that the point estimate of the interaction between NonComStandards and PatToProductRatio is high; however, because the standard error is also large, the result is not statistically significant.
Other robustness checks
One important variable in the knowledge production function is the R&D spending related to area k by firm i in year t (R ikt ). Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain these data for our sample firms, and so it is excluded from our baseline model. To alleviate this concern, we retrieve the yearly R&D firm-level spending data from Compustat for a total of 151 public firms in our sample. Following the existing literature (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis 2001), we use contemporaneous flows of R&D spending in our regressions.
Moreover, because of our inclusion of employment to control for firm size in the specifications, we normalize R&D spending by the number of employees. We test the robustness of the previous results in Tables 3 to 6 based on these public firms and using R&D spending as an additional firm-year control. The results are very consistent with those in Tables 3 to 6 and are available upon request. A summary of the main results is reported in Table 7 .
Second, note that, in our main analyses above, we cluster standard errors by firm, as a firm's patenting activity across different technological areas may be correlated. However, the number of standards will be repeated across firms within the same technological area, suggesting that standard errors should be clustered by technological area. Therefore, following the method introduced by Cameron and Miller (2015) , we cluster standard errors both by firm and by area. As presented in Table 8 , the results are consistent with the baseline results.
Third, as discussed in section 2, one mechanism through which standardization may influence strategic patenting is that IPR disclosures can reduce the search costs for standards users to identify IPR essential to implementation. One direct way to test this mechanism is to examine whether commercial standards subject to IPR disclosure would shape a firm's patenting behavior in a particular way.
Unfortunately, the institutional characteristics of the IETF during our sample period make the empirical test difficult in our setting. That is, the IETF experienced several changes and clarifications in terms of its IPR disclosure rule over our sample period. From 1994 to 1996, the IETF did not clearly specify its disclosure rule. While RFC 2026, published in 1996, incorporated some elements emphasizing the importance of IPR disclosure, it had no explicit requirement that standards contributors must disclose IPR until the clarification by RFC 3979 in 2005. As a consequence, as illustrated in Figure B in Appendix A.4, we see very few commercial standards associated with formal IPR disclosure, particularly in the early years of the sample.
Nevertheless, we do test how the number of commercial standards subject to IPR disclosure is associated with patenting. The results are presented in Table 9 . We note that, in addition to formal IPR disclosure, the standardization process itself reveals the identities of standards-contributing firms, a mechanism that could also clarify the important players in a technology space for standards users and thus reduce search costs. 40 Therefore, we investigate the effects of commercial standards subject to disclosure and the ones not subject to disclosure separately (as shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 ) and together (as shown in column (3) of Table 9 ). Although the coefficient estimate for the commercial standards not subject to IPR disclosure is significantly negative, the coefficient estimate for the commercial standards subject to IPR disclosure is close to zero and not significant in both columns (2) and (3). We further test how the effects of these two types of commercial standards change after the regime changes. As reported in columns (4) and (5) in Table 9 , when we look at them separately, the effects of both types of commercial standards become more negative following the regime changes. As reported in column (6), the results are weaker when they are included in one specification, which may be largely due to the high correlation between the two interaction terms. Taken together, although the results exploiting the regime changes are consistent with our argument that both types of commercial standards may reduce IPR infringement risks, our ability to empirically test the IPR disclosure mechanism is limited by the small number of standards associated with disclosure observed during our sample period. 
Conclusions
Although standards are widespread in product markets that leverage Internet and communication technologies, we still have limited systematic evidence on how standardization shapes the behavior of a community of firms that use these technologies to develop new products or services. This study seeks to bridge this gap, with a focus on the implications of standardization for strategic patenting by standards users.
We develop the argument that standardization (proxied by the number of commercial standards) in a technological area may identify important IPR in the area and clarify licensing terms for some of the IPR.
As a result, standards users face lower uncertainty and costs in accessing these IPR, and this reduction in 40 Our empirical results on how the effect of commercial standards vary with the IPR holdings of standardscontributing firms are consistent with this view: In a technology area where standards-contributing firms hold a large proportion of IPR in the area, we would expect standardization will be more effective in revealing the holders of both standards-essential and related patents; consequently, their contributed standards would have a stronger effect on reducing the need for strategic patenting.
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As noted above, one important change in IPR rules of the IETF in 1996 is that technologies encumbered by IPR may still be incorporated into standards when necessary to do so. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate how the marginal effect of commercial standards differ after the changes in IPR rules. As expected, the marginal effect of commercial standards is somewhat weaker after the change in rules that allows for encumbered technologies. We do not include these results as a separate table both because the rules change does not vary across technological areas (and so we do not have a natural control group) and because the rules change may be an endogenous response to "facts on the ground" in the IETF standard-setting process. However, these results are available upon request. uncertainty leads to less strategic patenting. Our empirical evidence supports this argument. Second, we find that the effect of commercial standards is even more pronounced for technological areas affected by regime changes that strengthened the enforceability of software patents. This result is consistent with the view that standardization may be especially important in environments where the ex ante IPR infringement risk is high. However, we find no differential effects of noncommercial standards before and after the regime changes. These exercises exploring the regime changes also lend credence to a causal relationship between commercial standardization and strategic patenting. Third, we find that the relationship between commercial standards and patenting in an area is stronger (more negative) when standards-contributing firms hold a large proportion of IPR in the area. Taken together, these findings support the view that standardization influences IPR infringement risks for standards users, the core argument of this paper.
Our research makes the following contributions to the literature. First, most studies in the standards and SSOs literature focus on the standards-setting process itself or the behavior of standards-contributing firms, that is, the SSO members that attempt to embed their technologies in standards (e.g., Bar and Leiponen 2014; Baron, Menière, and Pohlmann 2014; Farrell and Simcoe 2012; Lerner and Tirole 2006) .
As discussed above, there has been far less exploration of the behavior of a larger community of firms that use standardized technologies. Our paper is perhaps closest to Rysman and Simcoe (2008) , who examine the economic and technological significance of SSOs based on the citation profile of patents disclosed during the standard-setting process. Our study complements the important findings in that work by highlighting the role of standardization in clarifying the identity of important IPR holders and reducing uncertainty related to licensing terms. Therefore, it may shed light on recent policy debates on the welfare implications of standardization.
Relatedly, while a body of work has suggested that standardization has the potential to be a useful approach for addressing the patent thickets problem (e.g., Shapiro 2000 Shapiro , 2001 , little research has sought to test this hypothesis. Our study addresses this gap by focusing on one downstream implication of patent thickets, namely, the incidence of a firm's strategic patenting behavior. More broadly, recent studies have explored how multilateral institutions, such as patent pools or patent commons, can influence innovation or patenting (e.g., Baron and Pohlmann 2015; Joshi and Nerkar 2011; Moser 2010, 2013; Wen, Ceccagnoli, and Forman 2015) . They show mixed results, varying across different institutional mechanisms and industries. Our research adds to this stream of literature by investigating another institution: standards developed by SSOs.
Our study also informs a growing body of literature that explores the factors that shape the incidence of strategic patenting (e.g., Graevenitz, Wagner, and Harhoff 2013; Ziedonis 2004 ). Although it is well known that strategic patenting could impose high transaction costs for other firms seeking to innovate (Hall et al. 2012) , it remains less understood which institutional mechanisms can be put in place to effectively reduce strategic patenting. Our results demonstrate that the standards-setting efforts by industry participants may point to a viable solution, particularly in environments where the existing IPR litigation risks are high. Therefore, for policy makers, these findings suggest that the benefits of standardization could go beyond solving transaction costs related to technical coordination.
Our study has some limitations. As noted throughout the paper, one identification challenge we face is that standardization reflects some unobserved market-level factors that can influence a firm's patenting behavior. Moreover, standardization can lead to changes in market structure or competition in the technology market. This could affect a firm's R&D incentives (Baron, Menière, and Pohlmann 2014) and consequently a firm's patenting decision. Although our results based on a range of analyses lend support to the role of standardization in shaping patenting through influencing IPR infringement risks, our results must be interpreted with care. Further, our dependent variable captures both strategic patenting and invention.
Although we draw inferences about the effect of standardization on strategic patenting using structural assumptions based on the patent production framework, we are only able to develop bounds of the effects of standardization on strategic patenting. However, the totality of evidence supports the view that standardization has a negative effect on strategic patenting. Last, our findings study the effects of standards on strategic patenting in one particular setting: technology standards developed by groups within the IETF.
However, as noted earlier, our results may not hold in other settings. In this way, our study can be viewed as a starting point for future research that could investigate the overall effect of standardization in other SSOs where participation rules and IPR policies are different.
Our study also raises many important questions for future research. For example, how do the relationships between standards-contributing firms and noncontributing firms shape the effects of standardization on patenting activity? How can our results be generalized to other contexts? As we see a greater need for interoperability among products across a wide range of industries, such as the recent surge of activity developing around the "Internet of Things," future research could examine how standards users would react to the standardization efforts led by firms in other sectors where the patent thickets problem is less severe. We hope our research will lead to further exploration in this important field. Implied effect of commercial standards on strategic patenting Assume that the effect of commercial standards on knowledge production is zero (4) is measured using the number of standards developed by firms in CorpTech; ComStandards in all other columns is identified by author email address's top-level domain. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. (1) and (2) are based on a linear probably model with fixed effects; all other columns are based on a count data model with conditional fixed effects. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the same restricted sample. The number of firm-area pairs/observations in columns (3) and (4) is less than 1,158/5,205 because of the use of conditional fixed effects Poisson models, which drops the panels without any patent over the entire sample period or with only one observation. Column (5) is based on the full sample. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. No. of observations 7583 7583 Notes: PatToProductRatio is based on pre-sample patent stock and number of products, so its direct effect is absorbed by firmtechnological area fixed effects. We take the log transformation of PatToProductRatio to reduce its skewness. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
APPENDIX: Additional Data Details
A.1 Additional Details on Determining the Timing of the Regime Shift for the Focal Technological Areas
To determine the timing of the regime shift for the focal technological areas, we first identify whether and when each of our focal patent classes was influenced by which regime change. This is based mainly on a combination of the data from Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) and manual classification. More specifically, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) reported a list of software product markets and when these markets were affected by the two legal regime changes. Based on the concordance between product markets and patent classes they created, we know whether certain patent classes were affected. For the patent classes that appear in both our and their study, we directly use the timing of the regime shift reported by them. For the patent classes that appear only in our study, we determine the timing mainly based on the discussions by Hall and MacGarvie (2010) and manual reading of the patent class descriptions at the USPTO website. Table A .1 presents a complete view on whether and when each of our focal patent classes was influenced.
Then, based on the concordance between patent classes and technological areas, we determine which areas were most affected by each of the two regime changes. This is based on the percent of presample patent stock in an area that is related to software embedded in physical media (for the regime change in 1996) and business methods and disembodied algorithms (for the regime change in 1998). Among the six areas, because the Operations and Management area and the Routing area have the highest percentage of presample patent stock related to software embedded in physical media, we consider these two areas most affected by the regime change in 1996. Similarly, because the Application area and the Internet area have the highest percentage of presample patent stock related to business methods and disembodied algorithms, we consider these two areas most affected by the regime change in 1998. Therefore, D(regime change) kt dummy in equation (6) equals one for the Operations and Management area and the Routing area after 1996; it equals one for the Application and Internet area after 1998; for the other two areas (Security and Transport), it remains zero during the entire sample. 
A.2 Additional Details on Mapping Patent Classes to Technological Areas
In the example below, for RFC x that belongs to technological area k, suppose we find its author, Fred Baker, holds patent US 6742044 through a name search in the U.S. Patent Inventor Database. Then, we consider this patent's three-digit USPTO class-709-matched to RFC x and therefore a candidate for technological area k's patent class. Through this procedure, one RFC could be matched to one patent class or multiple patent classes. In the latter case, it could be due to one author having patents in different classes or multiple authors with patents in different classes. After obtaining all possible RFC-patent class matches, we aggregated them to the technological area level and use the top 10% most frequent patent classes as the representative patent classes for that area. Validating the mapping results. We validate our mapping results by comparing the citation patterns among patents matched to the focal areas with the citation patterns among standards in the focal area shown by Simcoe (2015) . More specifically, Simcoe (2015) finds that the majority of standards' citations occur within each IETF area. Thus, in this exercise, for the patents assigned to each area, we compute the average percentage of backward citations that are in the same area, other five areas of our interest, and other areas not covered by the mapping. As shown in Table A .2, we see a significantly higher percentage of withinarea patent citations than cross-area citations for all six technological areas. Such high consistency between the patent citation patterns below and the standard citation patterns seems to suggest that our mapping is valid. 
A.3 Additional Details on Mapping Product Markets to Technological Areas
In this section, we discuss the detailed procedure of matching product markets to technological areas. Our basic idea is first to identify firms' conference attendance and email discussion behavior across the six technological areas; then, based on which technological areas they participate in and which product markets they are active in, we create the product-area concordance. We use the set of narrowly defined product markets provided by CorpTech to define the set of products in this mapping.
As noted earlier, each technological area at the IETF has many working groups, each of which addresses specific topics. Each working group uses a combination of face-to-face conference sessions and email discussions to receive inputs and feedbacks from all interested parties.
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We first download all meeting minutes and email discussions from the IETF. The meeting minutes sometimes keep track of the identity of the participants (including email addresses) in the conference sessions hosted by each of the working groups.
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Similarly, most working groups maintain a listserv and archive all emails sent by participants. Therefore, through searching for each of our sample firms' top-level domains in each of the working groups' email and meeting records, we are able to identify the sample firms' participation behavior across these working group(s) and the corresponding technological area(s). In total, among the 566 noncontributing firms in our sample, we are able to match 551 noncontributing firms to different areas based on the email and meeting records.
One important concern is that the changes in the level of standardization over time may shift firms' participation behavior. Therefore, for each of the 551 firms, we keep the observations only in the first year of its appearance either in the meeting or email records. Moreover, because our goal is to understand which product markets are most relevant to each of the six areas, in order to make the mapping cleaner, we only keep single-product firms, that is, firms that operate in only one product market in the first year of its appearance in the records. This gives us 132 single-product firms for the concordance.
Based on these 132 single-product firms' products and those firms' participation across different areas, we are then able to identify all possible product markets related to each area. Our focus is to find the set of product markets that are most likely to respond to the changes in standardization in an area. Therefore, for each area, we calculate the frequency with which those product markets are observed. We then examine the markets in the top decile of the distribution and keep only the product markets that match to only one area. This procedure would ensure us in the concordance each area is matched to its most relevant products, and at the same time each product is matched to its most important area. During this process, because we
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As noted at the IETF website, "Each working group will determine the balance of email and face-to-face sessions that is appropriate for achieving its milestones. Electronic mail permits the widest participation; face-to-face meetings often permit better focus and therefore can be more efficient for reaching a consensus among a core of the working group participants." 43 In the later years of our sample, most meeting minutes no long keep track of such information. This is another reason why we need to combine both meeting and email records for the mapping.
observe the Internet area and the Operations and Management area include a set of products that all frequently appear in other areas, we are forced to drop these two areas. Further, this methodology gives us the same set of products matched to the Routing area and the Transport area, so we group these two areas into one. Table A .3 reports the final concordance used for the analyses. 
